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1.Introduction.
This paper sets out some of the results of field work undertaken
during 1992. The research aimed to examine the post-colonial
management of Maputo city with a view to gaining an understanding
of the problems of urbanization encountered since 1975 and the
measures taken by the Government at the local administrative
level to meet the many challenges posed by rapid urbanization in
a climate of rising popular expectations and shrinking resources.
The main research questions posed related to structures, and to
formal participation: how was the management of basic urban
services affected by the transition to independence in 1975, and
how were local decision-making structures influenced by the
programmes adopted by the new government with its emphasis on
popular participation? The research involved documentary work
centred on the Conselho Executivo1 and interviews with some key
local state personnel.
This paper is an attempt to examine these questions in the light
of the conference theme of "Democracy: Popular Precedents,
Popular Practice and Popular Culture" and to begin, thinking about
what the research to date with its particular focus can say about
the "politics of the base" in a phase of democratic transition.
The paper begins with a very brief overview of the colonial
system of urban administration in order to provide the necessary
contextualization for an analysis of the new system introduced
by Frelimo after it took power in 1975. It then moves on to look
'The Conselho Executivo or Executive Council is the body
charged with running the city.
at Maputo's urban administration in transition after
independence, situating it within the broader context of the
political conjuncture in which Mozambique achieved its
independence in the mid-1970's. It also suggests an analysis of
the emerging post-colonial state at the local level in terms of
the articulation of inherited structures and political culture
with the goals and working methods of the liberation movement.
The paper gives an account of the restructuring undertaken, the
problems of city management encountered and . the solutions
attempted, within the context of rapidly contracting resources
and disastrous economic decline. These factors seriously
incapacitated and disorganized the state at all levels, to the
point where crisis management at the local level superceded local
administration.
Faced with the unworkability of the systems introduced at
independence the ruling party was forced to begin
reconceptualizing its methods of administration at the local
level towards the end of the 1980's. The various initiatives for
reform and their focus are described, and some questions raised
about the top-down management of the reform process and the
implications for reform of the lack of a strong civic culture.
The role of donors, bilateral agencies and the international
community in the reform process is also considered, in the
context of a state which has become disarticulated, a party which
has lost its mass base and a society which is undergoing
structural adjustment.
The Camara Municipal, Colonial Urban Management and local
participation.
It is very difficult to talk about democracy in any sense of the
term in the context of the Portuguese colonial system. The colony
of Mozambique was administered as an integral part of Portugal,
as an "overseas province." Its status was governed by the
Colonial Act of 1930 and subsequent refinements in the 1950's and
60's. The general character of the colonial administration was
derived from the corporatist and authoritarian, some would say
fascist, model of metropolitan Portuguese politics. From the coup
of 1926 Portugal became a highly centralized, repressive one
party state.
Under the corporatist system which developed, individuals were
not directly represented politically. Representation was based
on corporate groups comprising established institutions in
society such as the Catholic church, the military, professions,
industry, banking, employer organizations and trade unions. The
basic functions of government were carried out by an
administration in combination with advisory bodies.
The system of local administration that developed in the colonies
has to be seen in the context of the authoritarian political
culture developed from the 1930's under the Estado Novo which
encouraged strong central control rather than autonomous local
government. The Portuguese system of local administration
differentiated between Africans and non-Africans, despite the
protestations of apologists for the system that it was not
racially based.2 At the level of the city, African
Administration fell under the District Administration, which had
far fewer resources at its disposal to provide services for the
periurban areas where the bulk of the African population lived
in precarious physical conditions.'
After the Second World War Africans were governed by the Native
Statute (Estatuto dos Indigenas) of 1954 which defined the
political status of Africans, their separate legal status and the
requirements for obtaining full citizenship through the process
of assimilation. The 1961 uprising and the initiation of the
armed struggle for national independence in Angola forced a
reconsideration of several aspects of colonial policy, and the
repeal of the Native Statute theoretically gave Africans the full
rights of Portuguese citizens. In the last phase of colonial rule
political decentralization accorded greater authority to organs
of colonial administration.
By the late 1960's the rapid population growth of both Luanda in
Angola and Lourenco Marques necessitated the introduction of "a
special regime for large cities" which gave to the colonial
capitals the competences at the municipal level of metropolitan
cities such as Porto.4. In creating the new regime, factors such
as population growth, level of urbanization, importance of
commercial and industrial activity and the volume of revenues
were taken into account.
The city of Lourenco Marques was divided for administrative
purposes into bairros (suburbs) and these in turn were divided
into freguesias (parishes). The municipal council, the Camara
Municipal, was headed by a president, a political appointee
nominated by the governor.
Ten municipal councillors and their alternates were elected
corporatively by local advisory boards, bodies representing moral
and cultural interests, employer and employee organizations, and
individual registered voters, with each group electing two
councillors.(Decree 48 575: articles 1-9) The council met in
ordinary session once a month. Extraordinary sessions could be
called by the president or an absolute majority of councillors.
The president exercised substantial executive powers, from the
drawing up of agendas for council meetings to discipline of
employees. The president exercised his executive powers in
consultation with the heads of the municipal directorates, whose
aThe definitive local study of the colonial city in English
is Penvenne, (1981).
'The best study of the African administration of the
colonial city is Rita-Ferreira A (1967/8)
'.Regime Especial das Grandes Cidades. Decree No. 48 575,
dated 12/9/1968, which came into operation in 1969.
appointment was carefully overseen by the provincial and central
authorities.
The competences of the Camara Municipal, in general terms,
included the administration of municipal property, development,
public supply, culture, education and social assistance, public
health and policing.0 The Camara had an autonomous legal
personality and the ability to enter into contracts for
development work subject to prescribed limitations.
Decision-making within the Camara Municipal was highly
centralized. The order of business for each sitting of the Camara
was prescribed by the Regulamento Geral, as were the portfolios
to be distributed among the councillors by the President.
Councillors sat as voting members of the administrative
commissions which oversaw the work of the various municipal
services. >
In concluding the overview of the colonial local administrative
system a few key factors which affected the manner of the
transition to independence stand out.
Firstly, the administration of the city of Lourenco Marques
developed as a dual system; the Camara Municipal for the cement,
settler town, and the District Administration for the de facto
African areas. Urban segregation was not legislated directly; it
was institutionalized and kept in place by racist colonial
practices which prevented upward class mobility and increased
earning capacity for non-assimilated Africans. The strict
enforcement of municipal building standard byelaws ensured that
there were very few African property owners in the foraJ, the
part of the city with a property register.6
Secondly, at independence the technical capacity and competence
of the urban Services of the Camara Municipal were adequate for
the foral, the cement city, only. Urban services for the rest
of the city were virtually non-existent, although efforts at
upgrading were undertaken in the late colonial period as part of
a belated and unsuccessful "hearts and mind" strategy on the part
5
 Powers and Competences of Councils are dealt with in
articles 17-23 of Decree 48 575 of 1968, and are listed in
detail. They cover the range of functions normally associated
with local level urban administration, ranging from maintenance
of parks and gardens through road construction and maintenance
to water supplies, public cleansing and waste disposal, markets
and abbatoirs and cemetries and licencing. The council also had
powers to levy municipal taxes and impose fines for the
infringement of local regulations, as well as exercising town
planning functions.
* For an analysis of the process of class stratification as
it affected the mestico and assimilado petit-bourgeoise see
Penvenne, J (1982) The Unmaking of an African Petite Bourgeoisie
African studies Centre, Boston University Working Paper No. 57
of the colonial administration.
Thirdly, the centralized nature of decision-making at local level
was a dominant feature of the system. Municipal legislation was
standardized throughout the colony, and came from Lisbon. The
President of the Camara Municipal was a political appointee of
the regime with executive authority. The role of councillors and
the administration was highly circumscribed by central
legislation and the corporatist principles of the regime. Central
political and administrative controls were maintained over local
administration at all times.
Finally, in the light of what appears above, and given the nature
of the colonial state and its social relations, it should be
clear that there was a critical absence of any firmly rooted
tradition of democratic citizen participation
in local government. Public participation in civil society from
the 1930's was dominated by the Catholic Church and the regime-
approved service organizations and trade union. Equally critical,
and an aspect of the subject which cannot be fully explored in
this paper, are the conceptions of democracy and accountability
developed by the various forces of resistance to the regime,
underground in Mozambique and Portugal, and in exile during the
colonial period, and in the prosecution of the national
liberation struggle in the countryside.
2.From Camara Municipal to Conselho Executivo: the transition
from Colonial, Rule.7
The transition from colonial rule to independence was a period
of considerable confusion, brought about by the collapse of the
colonial state and settler society, political uncertainty over
the future, the large scale exodus of settler skills and capital
occasioned by
 ; this uncertainty, and major expectations of
dramatic changes to the everyday lives of ordinary Mozambicans.
Frelimo was able to dominate the transition process because of
its political and military cohesion, divisions and uncertainties
within the ranks of the Portuguese negotiators which mirrored
conflicts within the metropolitan society over the future
following the April 1974 coup, and the absence of any organized
and credible alternative social force in Mozambique.
Frelimo's programme, developed during ten years of armed conflict
with the colonial regime, envisaged a radical transformation of
Mozambican society away from exploitative colonial and capitalist
social relations. The model chosen for independent Mozambique by
Frelimo drew ideological inspiration from the official Marxism
of the socialist bloc and its own experience of creating an
'The following section relies for its periodization, and
considerable portions of the detail on Pinsky, B (1985)
Territorial Dilemmas: Changing Urban Life in Saul, J (ed) A
Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique.
Monthly Review, New York.
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alternative administration in the liberated zones of the north.8
For Prelimo the towns were of secondary strategic importance to
the countryside where the bulk of the population lived.
Towns were regarded as privileged centres which facilitated the
exploitation of the rural areas, and as service centres for the
colonial economy.
Frelimo was very conscious of the issue of the colonial pattern
of urban development and the disjuncture between the cement city
and the canico, the reed settlements. Analyses redolent of
Fanon's contrasted the cement city inhabited by settlers and
based on a sophisticated modern capitalist economy, well
serviced, and administered by the Camara Municipal with the reed
houses in which the majority of the population lived with minimal
access to basic urban services. The former was the privileged
locus of colonial capitalism and potential counterrevolution, the
latter the target for political organization and upgrading.
The signature of the transitional government agreement between
Frelimo and the Portuguese government, in Lusaka on September
24th, 1974 precipitated the seizure of the radio station by
settler elements, disturbed at their exclusion from the
negotiations, who called on South Africa to intervene. The
failure of the settler manifestation, and the ensuing violence
in the city created panic and turned the exodus of settlers into
a flood. The majority of the estimated 250 000 settlers left,
taking with them the skills necessary to run the economy and the
urban areas.
Soon after the initiation of the Transitional Government, Frelimo
created the Grupos Dinamizadores, as part of a political strategy
to deal with a number of growing urban, problems in the city :
rapid rural- urban migration, rising unemployment, the
uncontrolled occupation of abandoned properties, critical food
shortages and escalating crime.
GD's were heralded as the concrete manifestation of Poder
Popular, Peoples' Power.°
The city's housing stock was inadequate to meet the new demand,
and the lack of basic social services in areas outside the
jurisdiction of former Camara Municipal aggravated the situation
further. In the cement city there was rapid deterioration of
available housing stock due to its overutilization, lack of
maintenance and rural cultural practices incompatible with urban
living, for example the introduction of small livestock into
apartments and the indoor use of grinding mortars for food
* For a recent critique of Frelimo's marxism see Michel
Cahen (1993) Check on Socialism in Mozambique- What Check? What
Socialism? ROAPE No 57: 46-59.
• The role of the GD's during the transition, and their
subsequent incorporation into the state apparatus is a
fascinating story waiting to be written.
preparation.
Foreign exchange constraints became an additional problem for
urban administration. Urban services such as transport and waste
removal suffered severly from a lack of fuel and spare parts for
vehicles as well as replacements for ageing stocks, leading to
a rapid diminution in the number of serviceable vehicles
available. The decline of urban services such as rubbish removal,
septic tank emptying, and maintenance of drainage and sewage
systems led to the degradation of the urban environment and
additional health hazards.
Maputo developed food supply problems when the settler farms
surrounding the city, which formerly supplied fresh fruit and
vegetables as well as meat, dairy produce and poultry, were
abandonded.
In February 1976, following on from independence in June 1975,
Frelirao embarked upon a series of nationalization measures which
included land and rented accommodation. By so doing the state
inherited the management and control of a significant proportion
of Maputo's housing stock, which was turned over to the state
housing body, APIE, created for the purpose.
Urban unemployment in Maputo had become a major problem by 1976,
created by the collapse of the urban economy: manufacturing
industry, services, hotels, shops, offices, restaurants and
domestic employment all virtually disappeared with the settler
exodus and the abandonment of enterprises and loss of other
employment opportunities this entailed. In addition the South
African Chamber of Mines embarked on a strategy of indigenizing
its migrant labour force in the mid-1970's in response to
political uncertainty in the region, thus exporting unemployment
to Southern Mozambique.
In 1977 Frelimo held its 3rd Congress at which it converted
itself from a broad national liberation front into a Vanguard
Party guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The party
became the only legally recognized political force in the country
and assigned itself the leading role in the transition to
socialism in Mozambique.10 The Economic and Social Objectives
spelt out at the Congress involved control by the state over the
commanding heights of the economy and extensive state
intervention.
In 1978 the Camaras Municipals and Cortes Locals (Local Councils)
were abolished and their replacements, the Conselhos Executivos,
created. The following year, the First National Meeting on Cities
10
 The particular conception of democracy held by Frelimo's
leadership did not allow for independent organization outside of
the control of the party. Frelimo's dominant working method was
based on the polarity of incorporation or exclusion: you were
either with or for the party, or against it, and therefore an
enemy.
and Communal Neighbourhoods, a gathering that was to prove
critical for the future of the cities was called. The aim of the
meeting was to analyse the political, economic, financial and
social situation of the major urban areas in Mozambique and to
propose solutions to the problems confronting them.11
In its conjunctural analysis of the political situation, the
gathering concluded that the cities at that time were a site of
intensified class struggle between the forces of the people led
by Frelimo and a range of reactionary enemy forces including
infiltrators and individuals compromised by colonialism. The aim
of "the enemy" was to destabilize Mozambique's economy and
internal order, creating popular discontent, thus undermining
mass confidence in Frelimo as the Vanguard Party. The national
meeting was confident that the heightened struggle was an
indication that Frelimo's line was correct and that what was
being witnessed were the death throes of a desperate reactionary
force on its last legs.
"We are dislodging the snake from its nest."
(RPM 1979:Resolugao Geral, Situacao Politica. p7.)
The General Resolution provided a comprehensive listing of the
problems which had emerged in relation to the urban areas;
the major issue isolated being the uncontrolled influx of rural
population into cities, which placed great stress on already
severely limited resources. To combat this a system of controls
over, movement was introduced : the residence card and the guia
de marcha to regulate travel between provinces. Control of influx
was also seen as a method of tackling the root of many of the
social ills being catalogued, such as urban marginality, banditry
and prostitution. Attention was given to the rural side of the
urban equation insofar as the creation of communal villages and
large-scale agricultural projects were prescribed as a method of
improving life in the countryside, keeping people on the land and
away from the cities.(RPM 1979: 12)
Strong emphasis was placed on the organized participation of
citizens as a way of overcoming problems in the towns."
11
 The meeting considered a wide range of urban issues, and
issued resolutions on the following issues: supplies to the
cities, the Green Zones, on criteria for the establishment of the
area and system of administration of Mozambique's 12 cities, on
the population census, the role of Mass Democratic Organizations,
on the organization of state administration in the cities, and
on the organization of Dynamizing Groups and Communal
Neighbourhoods.
"The transition period is very marked by the organizational
and mobilizational style of politics, with the militaristic
overtones derived from the war of national liberation. Frelimo's
conception of democracy was Leninist; (some would go further and
say Stalinist) its conception of development was in terms of a
forced march. Frelimo sought in this phase to extend its control
8
Citizens were to be organized at a number of levels. At the local
level the Grupos Dinamisadoras were to be the link between the
Party and the state. The creation for the first time of Frelimo
party committees at the city level gave the party the tool to
directly intervene in the process of the creation of GD's at the
local level, as well as to monitor the security arrangements
organized by the army involving the People's Militia, and the
enforcement of controls over movement into and out of cities.
The Mass Democratic Organizations- the OMM and OJM, and the
Production Councils, were structured to follow the direction of
Frelimo and to operate under the principles of democratic
centralism. They were effectively part of the state aparatus,
with a task to perform in the organization of the Grupos
Dinamizadoras and their work.
The City Assembly was called on to adopt a plan of action for the
creation of Bairros Communais, communal neighbourhoods, with a
clear demarcation of functions and allocation of tasks. Basic
supplies for the bairros were to be monitored through organs of
popular control and organized through a network of people's
shops, private traders and consumer cooperatives created on a
pilot basis, to ensure the equitable distribution of a guaranteed
basic minimum of consumer items at controlled prices.
The dominant discourse regarding the former administration
stressed its destruction in order to build new structures and
organization.
"In order to do this it is necessary to totally
destroy colonial structures and to eliminate the
accompanying bourgeois mentality, securing state
control and new forms of organization for the
population living in the cities."
The General Plan of Action for the years 1979/80 outlined by the
First National Meeting was designed to consolidate popular power
in the city, under the slogan "Organize the Cities and Communal
Neighbourhoods to consolidate popular power".
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the review of the
transition period. Firstly, there was a very rapid collapse of
the colonial state and settler society during the transition
period, and with it collapsed the former basis of accumulation
founded on the colonial economy. The unintended consequences of
this dramatic collapse were very far reaching for the fabric of
urban life in Maputo. The problem facing Frelimo in this phase
was how to salvage from the collapse enough of the former
structures in order to maintain order and meet the basic needs
of the urban population. At same time Frelimo was committed to
making a revolution in which the rural areas took precedence.
over every aspect of civil society.
9
Cities took second place in the party's scheme of priorities.
Critical decisions for the future of the urban areas and for
local government were made in the transition period. The colonial
Camaras Municipals were abolished as unsuitable instruments for
the creation of new cities, because of their class basis and
because of their limited technical and geographic jurisdiction.
New instruments were created which relied in part on continued
popular mobilization for their effectiveness, and which were
subordinated to the control of the dominant single party.
The administrative structures, and the political culture that
emerged, were an amalgam of the old order that Frelimo was sworn
to destroy and the new that was pledged for the future. The
continuities in urban administration were very striking. The head
of the local administration remained a political appointment, and
the degree of control by the central government' over local
administration introduced by Frelimo consolidated and took to its
logical conclusion the colonial system. Forms of representation,
whilst not being corporatively organized, were also carefully
structured by Frelimo.
Dominant during the transition phase, the language of rupture
with the past and the plans to create new cities organized on
very different principles from the old were more a reflection of
desire than capacity, and effectively masked some very striking
continuities both in structure and practice.
3.Crisis Management: 1980-1987.
The decade of the 1980's began on an optimistic note in
Mozambique. The transition to independence had been chaotic, and
almost immediately thereafter the country had become embroiled
in the Zimbabwean liberation war, at considerable cost. However
in 1980, with Zimbabwe's independence the prospects for peace and
rapid development in Mozambique seemed greatly enhanced.
The government declared the 1980's the decade of the conquest of
underdevelopment, and launched an ambitious large-scale ten year
plan, the Piano Prospectivo e Indicativo, which emphasized three
main themes: the socialization of the countryside, rapid
industrialization and the training of the country's
workforce. (Francisco: 1992) However, the decade which began with
such high hopes for rapid social and economic advances ended up
as a nightmare of spreading societal breakdown.
Both rural and urban populations became the victims of the
collapse, which was caused by the escalation of war, natural
disasters such as droughts and floods, a crisis in production and
financing, lack of foreign investment and economic policies which
relied on administrative implementation and aggravated existing
economic imbalances.
The Maputo City Executive Council.
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The structural framework for the new CECs and their
responsibilities had been laid down in detail at the First
National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods in 1979.
The CEC was to be the executive arm of the local Popular
Assembly. Its task was to oversee the directors of each of the
central government agencies operating in the area. Law 7/78
defined the CEC as composed of the President; the Director of
Apoio e Controlo (Assistance and Control); Director of Order and
Security; Director of the Implementation Commission of Production
Councils; Director of Internal Commerce; and Representatives of
Social Sectors.
The state apparatus at the city level was defined as : the Office
of the President of the CEC; the Directorate of Apoio e Controlo;
and the Directorates of the city level government agencies. The
distinction between the City Executive Council and the state
apparatus became blurred quite early on, leading to a confusion
of broad governance functions with the state apparatus and local
service provision.
The CEC was made responsible for the entire population and
territory of the city, something which led to problems in
defining its boundaries. It was also responsible for the full
range of economic, social and cultural concerns of the
population. It was expected that the CEC would not only provide
urban services, but would also direct agricultural and industrial
production, commerce, food distribution, schools, health centres
and other state activities. At a time when administrative
resources of finance and skilled personnel were severely limited
and contracting, the tasks of local city administration were
being broadened both geographically and in terms of the scope of
activities to be undertaken.
Such was the confidence and enthusiasm of the policy makers that
it was believed that with popular participation harnessed to
these tasks all things would be possible. Popular participation
was the key to providing the resources necessary to take on this
greatly increased responsibility. The CEC was to carry out its
new tasks as part of the central state, without local
administrative or financial autonomy. The CEC became in effect
a local arm of the central state, and in this sense it is
incorrect to talk about local government in post-colonial Maputo;
it is a form of deconcentrated central administration at the
local level.
The City Assembly.
City Assemblies were created for the first time in 1977 following
the guidelines presented at Frelimo's III Congress. Candidates
for election to the city assembly were elected by universal
suffrage from a list approved by the local Frelimo structures.
The "highest organ of Peoples'Power at the local level" was
designed to direct, guide and render accountable the conselho
Executivo in its management of the city.
Assemblies at all levels - national, provincial, district, city
11
and locality- were given a wide range of tasks, including the
"consolidation of national independence, assuring social
progress, organizing state power and promoting increased
productivity". They were also enjoined to study and publicize
the decisions of the III Congress relating to the consolidation
of the worker-peasant alliance and the construction of socialism.
Particular stress was placed on the planning of economic and
social activities and the mobilization of the masses in order to
accomplish tasks defined by the state, such as
"the fight against saboteurs, agitators, undisciplined
individuals, and all acts which could prejudice peace
and social progress."
Assemblies were to draw on the best experiences of the masses,
and to dedicate themselves to the solution of the concrete
problems in the lives of the people, in order to guarantee that
citizens received effective assistance from state organs without
undue bureaucratic obstacles. (Article 4)
In practice, the City Assembly was not an effective organ of
democratic oversight due to a number of factors. City Assemblies
were supposed to meet in ordinary session every two months, and
could be convoked for extraordinary meetings by the President of
the Executive Council, the Frelimo City Committee, or a minimum
one third of Deputies. Arranging transport for the delegates and
the logistics of running the sessions made them a complex
organizational process. The sessions were relatively infreguent.
It appears that from 1982 Assembly sessions were reduced to one
or two per annum, which meant that the capacity for oversight
of the business of city management by the Assembly was very
limited.
• The wide range of tasks that the Assembly was expected to
undertake in the limited time available made the work of the
various commissions pressured, and of necessity rather
superficial at times. The technical complexity of the tasks the
Assembly had to oversee would also have taxed the educational and
skill levels of many of the delegates present.
The structuring of assembly functions and procedures by the
Conselho Executivo right down to the setting of Agendas and the
stipulation of a minimum dress code for delegates meant that in
practice it was difficult for the delegates to structure debate
independently. All Agendas for sessions received prior Party City
Committee vetting before proceeding to the Conselho Executivo for
its attention.
Assembly sessions were to be public, except where the President
ruled otherwise. Deliberations were to be widely publicised, with
popular participation in preparation for the sessions,
coordinated through the mass democratic organizations. In
general, voting in local assemblies was to be carried out by open
show of hands, decisions of the assembly being publicized by
12
deputies at popular gatherings where they were explained, and
popular participation encouraged. (Resolution 13/78)
Dynamizing Groups.
The Maputo City Party Committee meeting in special session
following the IV Congress of FRELIMO in 1983 stressed the need
for better organization and mobilization at the local level in
order to deal with the principal problems faced by the city's
population, which it defined as the need for defence and popular
vigilance, the fight against hunger through increased rural
production and combatting the black market through improvements
in the organization and control of supplies.
Organizational priorities were to consolidate the party
structures in the Urban Districts and Bairros, to oversee the
creation of District Executive Councils by the City Executive
Council, and the motivation of the Dynamizing Groups in their
creation of Quarteirao commissions. The Party at the level of
the City had as its role the control and coordination of a web
of local organs, ranging from subordinate party structures
through to sections of the state apparatus such as the Maputo
garrison and commando, as well as Mass Democratic Organizations
like the Organization of Mozambican Women.
Apart from creating the new District Executive Councils and
selecting and training their executive personnel, the Maputo CEC
had as a further task the responsibility for selection and
training of Dynamizing Group administrators. The Dynamizing
Groups had by the early 1980's lost their popular mobilizational
roots of the transition period and had become a local
administrative structure at the level of the bairro, being
charged with a wide range of social, economic and cultural tasks.
These included the orientation, coordination and control of
Quarteirao" Commissions, and assisting in the economic life of
the Bairro through involvement in the running of the production
and consumer cooperatives. In addition the Dynamizing Groups were
charged with assisting in the functioning of health posts and
schools as well as organizing residents to fight against the
black market by setting up inspection brigades. With the
continued influx of population into the urban areas as a result
of insecurity in the rural areas the Dynamizing Groups became
involved in unofficially allocating land and authorizing
construction, despite their legal incapacity. Part of the problem
lay in the slowness with which the CEC made available sites for
housing. (Jenkins,1991:32)
The Dynamizing Groups generally employed a secretary and one
other official, a pennanente, the other tasks being allocated to
voluntary part time officials. A key function of the Dynamizing
Groups was the maintenance of "popular vigilance" as the climate
3A Quarteirao was comprised of a block of 50-100 houses.
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of insecurity brought about by the war spread to the urban
bairros. The control function of the Dynamizing Groups was
underlined in the central role they played in "Operation
Production" in 1984 when the government attempted to remove
people it defined as unproductive from the city and relocate them
to the northern provinces to work on agricultural projects. The
Dynamizing Groups performed a document screening function which
seriously compromised their ability to mobilize participation
after the government called off the relocation exercise in the
face of mounting criticism.
The Quarteirao was a lower level of organization, based on a
grouping of 50-100 houses, and was run on a voluntary basis. The
tasks of the quarteirao were similar to those of the Dynamizing
Groups, but organized at a lower level. They included popular
vigilance, activities in the area of health, hygiene, the
environment and housing, social work, education and propaganda,
culture, sport and recreation and statistical enumeration of
residents. (Partido Frelimo, 1984) They were also responsible
for the mobilization of the Ten Family units, which were the
lowest level of popular organization in the urban areas.
With the growing hardships faced by urban residents and
increasing social fragmentation and disorganization brought on
by multiple crises it became increasingly difficult to moblize
the population effectively. The government lost much sympathy
over the way it had implemented "Operation Production" and a
certain cynicism over voluntary work and mobilization seems to
have taken root by the mid -1980's. Consequently the hold of the
party on the urban population was weakened, and its ability to
control and direct declined correspondingly.
The lack of autonomy of the Conselho Executivo had several
profound effects on local administration. Politically, it meant
the direct subordination of the city management to the state, and
through party control of the state, to the party. Being the
capital city, national concerns and priorities were mostly
articulated from Maputo, and these were usually translated into
directives issued by central leadership which local level
structures were expected to implement. The effect was the
"capturing" of local level administration by central government
in a manner which could on occasions seriously divert effort,
energy and resources from local issues to questions of national
concern in a manner that was prejudicial to the coherence and
effectiveness of local level administration.
The lack of financial autonomy at the local level produced a
limited concern with the development of local financial
resources or the careful management of available revenue. It also
led to the loss of the habit of financial responsibility in
decision making, and a lack of focus on institutional
development.(World Bank,1991.)
When the CEC was created, virtually all local taxes which had
been sources of revenue for the Camara Municipal ceased to be
collected, and the CEC became totally dependent on central
financial transfers. Resource-generating local activities, such
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as water and electricity provision were removed from the control
of the CEC and established as autonomous enterprises.
A further feature of the particular legacy of colonial
corporatist urban management and its articulation with democratic
centralism was that the local forms of representation, for
example at the City Assembly level, were structured in such a way
as to render them susceptible to central political control. Local
participation was organized through indirect elections, where
City Assembly delegates were elected by community based
representatives organized into electoral colleges.
The overlap of functions between party and state at the senior
levels of the local administration was very considerable. The
President of the CEC was generally also the President of the City
Assembly, in his capacity as first secretary of FRELlMO's city
level organization. '
Would Maputo's urban management crisis have been less severe if
the structures created by Frelimo on gaining power had been
different? When looking at city management before its reform
phase it is hard to separate out the effects of the structures
that were put in place during the transition process and the
political decisions made then about the nature of central-local
relations and the role of the party, from the effects of the
generalized crisis of the city during this period due to the
effects of war and destabilization.
It is certainly possible to point to a number of features of the
system as it developed and to argue that inherent in them lay the
seeds of disorganization, the confusion of functions and levels
of administration, lack of local level autonomy at the
administrative and financial level, and the drain of personnel
from local administration to central government, all of which
served to weaken administrative capacity. At the same time it is
impossible to ignore the colonial heritage of a dual city, the
chaos and confusion of the transition period and the destruction
and devastation of the confrontation with apartheid power in the
region, and the effects on an already disarticulated urban
environment.
5. Local Management and Local Reform.
The introduction in 1987 of the PRE (Economic Rehabilitation
Programme) signalled the full-scale adoption of capitalist
economic reforms under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank
which Mozambique had joined in 1984 after signing the Nkomati
Accord with South Africa. The initiation of the Nkomati process
unlocked western aid and assistance which had been denied
Mozambique until then, and set in train a series of policy shifts
and adjustments which have seen the abandonment of socialism as
a goal, and the transformation of Frelimo from a Marxist-Leninist
vanguard party into a broadly- based party of national consensus.
The Constitution of 1990 provided for political pluralism and
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expanded the freedom of expression, association and assembly,
thus relinquishing the claim of Frelimo since independence to
stand as sole legitimate and legal representative of the
Mozambican people in the political arena. Since 1991 the
government has been engaged in a comprehensive World Bank driven
programme of local reform.
Seminar on the Management of Local Governments.
The first step in the reform process was a seminar organized by
the Ministries of Finance, State Administration, and Water and
Construction with support from the World Bank and FINNIDA, held
in September 1988. The aim was to bring together a range of
foreign and local expertise and experiences to reflect on ways
in which local service delivery might be improved. The seminar
was organized within the context of the goal of PRE to introduce
national public service reforms aimed at greater efficiency and
cost effectiveness, and was related to the implementation of a
World Bank-financed Urban Rehabilitation Project in Maputo and
Beira.
The seminar, was organized around three themes: Drinking Water and
Sanitation; Solid Waste removal and Municipal Administration and
Finance. Emerging from the proceedings was the view that stronger
and more autonomous local governments were needed in order to
respond effectively to the crises of the cities and their
residents, and to contribute to national development.
A range of service delivery options involving combinations and
permutations of public and private involvement were considered,
the paramount criterion being effectiveness in carrying out
state-defined goals. It was recognized that the development of
more autonomous urban administrations involved the reorganization
of relations between central and local authorities, and that this
was not a simple technical and administrative matter but
involved political struggles between the various levels of the
state apparatus.
However proceedings at this seminar were designed in such a way
as to give priority to the solution of urban crises through a
concentration on how resources could be best mobilized and
deployed, and the issue of political autonomy was held to be
outside of the terms of the debate as structured at the seminar.
In other words, the technical and administrative questions were
tackled first whilst the thornier issues of the decentralization
of political power were set aside until the advent of promised
legislation on the matter.
It was recognized that the restructuring of local administrations
after independence had dramatically increased their
responsibilities without paying due attention to the need for
financial resources to carry out the additional tasks. Lack of
autonomy produced a limited concern at the local level with
developing local sources of finance or husbanding resources, and
that the habit of financial responsibility in decision-making
had been lost. (World Bank, 1991)
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The discussion on developing financial autonomy for local
administrations focussed on the need for the development of
appropriate local taxes. The principle that people should: pay
local taxes, even if they were only symbolic to start with, was
seen as important. It was held that urban residents had to learn
the obligation to pay taxes for services recieved as part of the
meaning of living in the city. The ultimate goal was to enable
local resources available through taxation and user charges to
progressively approach the level of local expens.es.
Interestingly, given the critique of the First Meeting on Cities
and Communal Neighbourhoods in 1979, considerable reference was
made to the need for a retrospective analysis of the extinct
colonial camaras in the light of their organization of municipal
services, use of municipal decrees, fines and police forces. It
was pointed out that the the colonial legislation 'still stood,
and could profitably be reviewed, revised and updated in order
to give local administration more regulative capacity.
The first World Bank Urban Rehabilitation loan was devoted to
infrastructural projects in Maputo and Beira. Discussions on how
to generalize local administrative reform suggested either that
the pilot project should be broadened to include other cities,
or that the administrative and financial reforms under discussion
could be undertaken immediately without waiting for the results
of the two city project.
Seminar on the Reform of Local Organs.
The second and current phase of local level reform was marked by
the holding of a workshop in November 1991 where a large-scale
process of social engineering was set in motion with the eventual
goal of rationalizing the development of the urban system of
selected cities in Mozambique. The workshop was funded by the
Municipal Development Programme of the World Bank and attended
by key Mozambican central government and local administrative
officials as well as representatives of NGO's, bilateral and
multilateral funding agencies. The aim of the workshop was to
provide an analysis of the current state of local administration
and establish a plan of action for urban rehabilitation. Key
documents presented to the workshop for this purpose were the
Ministry of State Administration's Decentralization and the
Autonomy of Local Organs and the World Bank's Urban Local
Government and the Environment Sector Review.
The Ministry of State Administration document provided an
analysis and critique of the current system of centralized
control. The document dealt with the political and economic
fundamentals of decentralization and autonomy of local bodies;
proposals for a new institutional system and its electoral
process; and a proposed financial model for local authorities.
The document noted that decentralization had become the object
of much debate in the context of greater political openness
within Mozambique, and that it was often presented as a panacea
for all political ills. Adopting a cautious approach, MAE argued
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that it would not produce the miracle of substantially increasing
the sum of material, human and financial resources available, but
it could improve efficiency in the use of scarce
resources.(MAE,1991:8)
The document appealed for a suspension of judgements on past
experiences of centralized control and noted the difficulty, in
making such judgements, of separating out the effects of
destabilization from those caused by deficiencies in the system.
It also argued that evaluations of the prior period are made all
the more difficult due to the fact of people having lived under
the illusion of the existence of. a state of strong national
unity, and ignoring, at least in public discussions, conflicts
of interests based on region and ethnicity. (MAE, 1991:9)
The Ministry of State Administration makes the point that when
decentralization was first discussed, the economy was still
largely based on principles of central planning, and that the new
forms of decentralization being discussed are only possible in
a market based economy in which the state intervenes minimally.
In prioritizing the cities for the process of decentralization
the Ministry of State Administration cautions that even in normal
conditions decentralization is a complex and difficult task. It
points out that war and the terrible impoverishment caused by it,
as well as excessive centralization and the weighty tradition of
command administration, inherited from the colonial period, make
decentralization a more complex and above all more risky , but
at the same time more urgent undertaking. (MAE,1991:86)
Risk of failure is great, and errors could have serious future
implications. The economy is fragile, resources are scarce and
the country cannot afford the luxury of costly experiments. The
maintenance of the previous system was blocking economic and
social development and preventing the participation of tens of
thousands of people whose conscious participation was fundamental
for the rapid overcoming of social misery. Apart from these
factors, the critique concludes that in the actual situation
where there was a latent conflict between central and local
structures it was not possible to maintain the highly centralized
form of administration.
The Workshop participants divided into four working groups to
discuss and make recommendations on the following areas:
Institutional and Legal Reforms, Urban Financial Management,
Infrastructure, Urbanization and Housing, and Urban Services and
the Environment. The working groups were formed with the aim of
drafting terms of reference for the second phase of the urban
rehabilitation process, which envisages an Urban Sector
Engineering Project.
The final workshop document with recommendations, which included
an endorsement of most of the proposals contained in the World
Bank Urban Local Government and the Environment Sector Review was
then forwarded to the Council of Ministers for approval making
it an official document with state authority. The four
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commissions set up by the workshop continued with their work and
had their terms of reference approved by the Council of
Ministers.
The Urban Sector Engineering Project, financed with World Bank
credits, involves the four commissions, comprised of national and
local officials working in conjunction with specialized
consultants, in the preparation, negotiation and implementation
of a range of urban interventions. The main objectives are to
strengthen the urban management capability of local governments,
lay the foundation for investment projects and rationalize the
activities of the various agencies in the field.
6.Conclusions.
Local reforms are being initiated at a time of great political
uncertainty and transition at the national level. The ceasefire
signed in October 1992, the demobilization of former corabatents
and the preparation for national multiparty elections are high
risk processes. The danger of failure and reversion to armed
conflict is real, with potentially disastrous consequences for
a society and economy already debilitated by the years of war and
destabilization since independence.
Transitions by their nature involve shifts away from the previous
structures and processes of control, which were known and
predictable, towards outcomes which are uncertain. The necessity
of reform is accepted in the light of the failures of the
previous system, but the reform process itself creates
uncertainty, and with it the potential for reversion to old
habits in its implementation.
The local reform process, at least in its conceptualization and.
initial phases, appears to be engineered from above. Reform from
above is a risk-limiting strategy by a government faced with the
uncertainties of a potentially uncontrolled process of
institutional change. In the shift from what is known and
predictable to the unknown and unpredictable the temptation to
control is very great. What is less certain is the actual
capacity to exercise control and oversight of the process.
Having experienced the failure of one set of experiments with
social engineering there is an understandable reluctance to
engage in what could turn out to be another equally costly
failure. However, this time the options available to the
government are seriously limited by the circumstances under which
the reforms are being introduced. The principal factors
structuring the reform process are the disarticulation of the
state and the aid-dependent nature of the society.
It is the disarticulation of the state that has enabled forces
based outside of Mozambican society, such as the World Bank and
the NGO's to play such a central role in the setting of the
agenda for reform. The extent to which the reform agenda is
being set and the terms of its implementaion laid down by funding
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agencies and consultants is very striking.
What is less clear is the actual working out in practice of a
possible convergence of interests between elements in the state
apparatus seeking both reform and control over the process, and
the preference of funding agencies for technocratic solutions
provided by consultants and experts. In a resource-starved
environment the bearer of resources is extraoridinarily powerful,
with an enhanced ability to coopt.
A further factor which serves to limit public debate and
oversight of the reform process is the fragility of civil society
in Mozambique. Whilst aware of the problems associated with an
uncritical use of the notion of civil society, what is being
pointed to is the absence of a tradition of independent social
organization and participation capable of scrutinizing the
actions of the state and defending civic interests14. The
Prelimo Party might have exercised some monitoring function in
the past, but it has lost the popular base it formerly enjoyed.
The market reforms introduced in the 1980's and especially since
1987 have unleashed a set of uncontrolled social forces which
have both undermined Frelimo's hold over society and further
narrowed its social base. The introduction of reforms is taking
place in a context where outside interests largely set the
agenda, the state has lost cohesion at all levels, and the
party's disciplining role is minimal. Given that the development
of civil society is embryonic, the reform process is not being
negotiated at any level of society other than the top, where
technocratic solutions are favoured.
These factors have implications for the working out in practice
of local level developments. The social forces unleashed by PRE
and market reforms have made local administration a key area for
influence in the process of accumulation at the level of the
city. The reforms at local level suit the emergent ruling groups,
insofar as there is a trend towards the emergence of local
"dictatorships". These are based on local branches of the state
apparatus which have become less accountable to the public over
time and which exercise an important function in the allocation
of scarce resources. Local notables are able to pursue their
interests within the bureaucracy through the informal exercise
of power. The system worked in this way in the past to some
extent, despite the existence of formal structures designed to
check the personal use of power. The question is will this system
of personalismo emerge much more fully in the future in the
absence of any operating system of checks on the dominant
"The development of "Civil Society" is a major
preoccupation of the many NGO's which have recolonized
Mozambique. In the process of their work they have contributed
in large measure to the further weakening of the state by their
personnel recruitment practices, and have in some instances set
themselves up as alternative state agencies.
For an extended critique see Hanlon, J (1991) Mozambique: Who
Calls the Shots? James Currey, London.
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interests.15
What does seem clear is the need for a functioning and coherent
system of urban management which is transparent and accountable
in its operations, at such a crucial stage in the development of
the city, when a whole range of uncontolled and uncontrollable
social forces are making their presence felt in the urban
environment. Although the language of class struggle may have
disappeared from the public discourse of reform in Mozambique,
in reality it still exists, and is being mediated through the
reform process.
1BThe development of local interests and power bases in the
process of accumulation, and the ongoing struggles of urban
dwellers to defend their declining living standards on a daily
basis is a rich field for investigation, and some important work
is being carried out in this area, for example by the Women and
Gender project of the Centre of African Studies, Maputo.
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